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PREVIEW; L.B. v. United States
Annie Holland*
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral argument in L.B. v.
United States1 on Friday, April 15, 2022, at 9:30 a.m. at the Dennison
Theater in Missoula, Montana. Timothy M. Bechtold and John Heenan are
expected to appear on behalf of Appellant L.B. Timothy A. Tatarka,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, is expected to appear on behalf of Appellee the
United States of America.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue certified to the Montana Supreme Court by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in L.B. v. United States is
whether, under Montana law, a law enforcement officer acts within the
course and scope of their employment when they use their authority as an
on-duty police officer to sexually assault members of the public.
This certifying question provides the Court the opportunity to
distinguish its opinion in Maguire v. State,2 finding that a Montana
Development Center employee’s sexual assault of an intellectually
disabled patient was outside the scope of his ordinary employment,3 from
a situation in which law enforcement officers use their power and authority
to sexually assault citizens.4
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

On October 30, 2015, L.B. and her mother left the boundaries of
the Northern Cheyenne Reservation in Lame Deer, Montana, to get
alcoholic beverages.5 Northern Cheyenne Criminal Code prohibits Tribal
members from possessing and consuming alcohol within the bounds of the

*

J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the
University of Montana, Class of 2023.
1
8 F.4th 868, 869 (9th Cir. 2021), certified question accepted sub nom.
495 P.3d 424 (Mont. 2021).
2
835 P.2d 755, 757 (Mont. 1992).
3
Id.
4
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, L.B. v. United States, No. 20-35514 (9th
Cir. Dec. 4, 2020) (citing Maguire, 835 P.2d at 755).
5
L.B., 8 F.4th at 869.
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Reservation.6 Upon returning to the Reservation and under the influence
of intoxicating beverages, L.B.’s mother decided to take the truck “for a
drive.”7 L.B. reported her mother to the police, and on-duty, uniformed
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Officer Dana Bullcoming responded to
L.B.’s call.8
After locating L.B.’s mother, Bullcoming drove to L.B.’s
residence.9 L.B. asserts that Bullcoming broke into her home while she
and her children slept.10 The United States asserts that Bullcoming entered
the home with L.B.’s permission.11 L.B. volunteered to Bullcoming that
she consumed “a couple drinks that evening, including a half of beer at her
residence” and that “her children were asleep” after Bullcoming asked
L.B. if she was alone at her residence.12 Next, Bullcoming led L.B. to his
patrol car to breathalyze her.13 There, Bullcoming threatened L.B. that he
could arrest her for child endangerment and take her children based on the
results of her breathalyzer test.14 In response to Bullcoming’s threat, L.B.
implored Bullcoming to show her mercy.15 If L.B. was arrested she would
lose her new job as a bus driver and her ability to support her children.16
Bullcoming repeatedly told L.B. “something had to be done.”17 After
several moments, it became clear to L.B. that Bullcoming wanted L.B. to
sexually gratify him in exchange for not arresting her.18 L.B. asked
Bullcoming if “something had to be done” meant “sex.”19 Bullcoming
affirmed L.B.’s suspicion.20 Bullcoming impregnated L.B. through
coercive, unprotected sex.21 L.B. subsequently gave birth to D.B.

6
N. Cheyenne Crim. Code § 7-9-6(a), available at
https://perma.cc/VZG2-2ZFB (“A person who is found under the influence of
intoxicating liquor within the exterior boundaries of the Northern Cheyenne
Reservation shall be charged with a violation of this section.”).
7
L.B., 8 F.4th at 869.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, L.B. v. United States, No. 20-35514
(9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2020).
11
Answering Brief of the United States at 5, L.B. v. United States, No.
20-35514 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2020).
12
L.B., 8 F.4th at 869.
13
Id. at 870.
14
Id.; N. Cheyenne Crim. Code § 7-9-6.
15
L.B., 8 F.4th at 870.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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In 2017, Bullcoming was indicted for his sexual assault on L.B. in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 for depriving L.B. of her constitutional rights
to bodily integrity while acting under color of law.22 Bullcoming pleaded
guilty to an offense he committed while on the United States’ payroll and
wearing his BIA-issued police uniform.23
B. Procedural Background
L.B. brought civil action pursuant to the Federal Torts Claims Act
(FTCA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Billings Division of the United States
District Court for the District of Montana against the United States, BIA,
and Bullcoming.24 L.B. alleged numerous intentional torts and
constitutional rights violations against Bullcoming and asserted that the
United States was liable for Bullcoming’s violations under the FTCA.25
In November of 2018, L.B. motioned the district court for partial
summary judgment, arguing that the United States was “vicariously liable”
for Bullcoming’s actions under the FTCA and the doctrine of respondeat
superior through Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214.26 The United
States cross-motioned for summary judgment, arguing that Bullcoming’s
sexual assault of L.B. fell outside the reach of the FTCA because
Bullcoming did not act in the scope and course of his employment with
the BIA.27 United States Magistrate Judge Timothy Cavan ruled in favor
of the United States, finding Bullcoming’s “tortious conduct was not
within the scope of his employment.”28
L.B. appealed Magistrate Judge Cavan’s decision; she argued the
magistrate court misapplied law and, in the alternative, the court should
certify the question to the Montana Supreme Court to determine the scope
of employment.29 United States District Court Judge Susan Watters
adopted Judge Cavan’s finding and recommendations in full and denied
L.B.’s motion to certify the question to the Montana Supreme Court.30
Judge Watters denied L.B.’s motion to certify for two reasons: (1) L.B.
filed the motion for certification “after receiving an adverse
22

Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 11, at 7.
Id.
24
L.B. v. United States, No. CV 18-74-BLG-SPW-TJC, 2019 WL
5298725, at *2 (D. Mont. July 16, 2019).
25
Id. at *1.
26
Id. at *2.
27
Id.
28
Id. at *7.
29
L.B. v. United States, No. CV-18-74-BLG-SPW, 2019 WL 4051946,
at *1 (D. Mont. Aug. 28, 2019).
30
Id.
23
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recommendation,” and parties “should be discouraged from seeking
certification of an issue after a magistrate issues an adverse
recommendation”;31 and (2) she found no question of state law unclear or
unresolved as Montana “defines the scope of employment to mean ‘in the
furtherance of his employer’s interest’ or ‘for the benefit of his master,’”
and that “rape is outside the scope of employment under that test.”32
L.B. appealed Judge Watters’s decision to the Ninth Circuit and
raised a single issue: “whether under Montana law, Officer Bullcoming’s
sexual assault of L.B. was within the scope of his employment as a lawenforcement officer.”33 L.B. alternatively moved the court to certify the
question to the Montana Supreme Court.34 The Ninth Circuit determined
that, because L.B.’s claim comes under the FTCA and state law applies, it
was appropriate to certify the question regarding the scope of a law
enforcement officer’s employment to the Montana Supreme Court.35
Montana law is applicable here as 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) provides that
“any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment . . . would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”36
The Ninth Circuit certified this question because the Montana
Supreme Court has not yet determined how the scope of a law enforcement
officer’s employment compares to other scopes of “ordinary
employment,” due to the greater authority law enforcement officers
carry.37 The Ninth Circuit also noted, as support for its decision to certify,
that this case furnishes the Montana Supreme Court with the opportunity
to provide equal legal remedy to Montana citizens who reside within
Indian reservations and are policed by federal officers rather than state
agents.38 The Ninth Circuit stated its policy concerns for equal legal
remedies for all Montanans as such:

31

Id. at *2.
Id. (citing Maguire v. State, 835 P.2d 755, 765 (Mont. 1992)).
33
L.B. v. United States, 8 F.4th 868, 870 (9th Cir. 2021), certified
question accepted sub nom. 495 P.3d 424 (Mont. 2021).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 872.
36
28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1); see also Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d 1073,
1076 (9th Cir. 1996); Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 968 F.2d 865, 876
(9th Cir. 1992) (“FTCA scope of employment determinations are made
‘according to the principles of respondeat superior of the state in which the
alleged tort occurred.’”).
37
L.B., 8 F.4th at 870–71.
38
Id. at 871–72.
32
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Victims of sexual assault by federal officers do not have
the benefit of the non-delegable-duty doctrine. As a result,
a Montana citizen who is a victim of sexual assault by a
state, county, or municipal law-enforcement officer has a
potential remedy in tort against the employer, while a
Montana citizen who is a victim of rape by a BIA police
officer does not, simply because the BIA officer is a
federal employee.39
The Ninth Circuit found this policy issue especially persuasive in
its decision to certify the question to the Montana Supreme Court
because “[t]he Montana Supreme Court might not otherwise be
presented with this dichotomy, as claims considering federal
officers are typically tried in federal court.”40
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

L.B. alleged numerous intentional torts and violations of her
constitutional rights in her original complaint. However, the only issue
certified to the Montana Supreme Court is whether the United States is
liable for Bullcoming’s actions when he, an on-duty BIA officer, sexually
assaulted L.B.
A. Appellant’s Argument
L.B. argues that Bullcoming acted in the scope and course of his
employment when he sexually assaulted her as an on-duty BIA police
officer. L.B. argues that the holding in Maguire is narrow and does not
provide a blanket rule that “sexual assault is always in every situation
solely for the self-gratification of the rapist.”41 Alternatively, L.B. argues
that the “role of sexual assault while policing” is a novel issue in Montana.
Next, L.B. points to Keller v. Safeway Stores42 to further support
the argument that Bullcoming acted within the scope and course of his
employment when he sexually assaulted her.43 The Court in Keller
determined that a jury could find a grocery store manager acted in the
scope of his employment in a slander case when he travelled to the
plaintiff’s house to demand that she “make good on a no good check”
because he would be personally liable for the money if the plaintiff’s check

39

Id. at 871.
Id.
41
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 4, at 3.
42
108 P.2d 605 (Mont. 1940).
43
Id. at 611.
40
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did not clear.44 The Court stated, “But even if we assume that he was not
the agent acting within the express scope of employment while attempting
to collect the check, we still have a question for the jury whether the
slander grew out of acts incidental to the employment.”45 Like the grocery
store employee in Keller, L.B. argues that Bullcoming’s “acts were in
furtherance of or incidental to the employment for which the agent was
expressly or impliedly engaged.”46 L.B. points to Bullcoming’s status as
an “on-duty police officer in full uniform acting in a law enforcement
capacity” to illustrate that Bullcoming’s actions were in the furtherance of
and incidental to Bullcoming’s employment as a BIA officer.47
Lastly, L.B. points to Montana Code Annotated § 2-9-305 to
support her argument that the United States should be held liable for the
actions of Bullcoming. L.B. asserts that the government is held liable for
unlawful assaults by police officers against citizens and should be held
equally accountable for sexually assaulting citizens. Montana Code
Annotated § 2-9-305(6)(b) waives immunity for governmental employees
whose conduct “constitutes a criminal offense.”48
B. Appellee’s Argument
The United States argues that Bullcoming did not act “in
furtherance of his employer’s interest” when he sexually assaulted L.B.49
Although the United States agrees that the FTCA waives the government’s
sovereign immunity for torts committed by its employees within the scope
and course of their employment, the United States contends that, under
Montana’s respondeat superior test, Bullcoming did not act within the
scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted L.B.50 The test for
the scope of employment in Montana is defined in Kornec v. Mike Horse
Mining & Milling.51 There, the Court determined that to act within the
scope of employment, the employee must be acting “in the course of his
employment in the furtherance of his employers interest, or the for the
benefit of his master.”52 The Court in Kornec clarified that a “servant who

44

Id. at 612.
Id.
46
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 4, at 4 (citing Keller, 108 P.2d at
45

611).
47

Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305 (2021).
49
Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 11, at 2.
50
Id. at 1.
51
180 P.2d 252, 256 (Mont. 1947).
52
Id.
48
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acts entirely for his own benefit is generally held to be outside the scope
of his employment and the master is relieved of liability.”53
The United States next points to the Court’s holding in Maguire
to support its position. The United States argues that the Court correctly
applied the Kornec “furtherance test” in Maguire when it declined to
expand the exception of the non-delegable duty doctrine and determined a
state hospital employee’s sexual assault of a mentally disabled patient
“was outside the scope” of his employment.54 The United States admits
that Bullcoming “engaged in ‘abhorrent’ sexual coercion entirely for his
own criminal interests.”55 However, it argues that Bullcoming “was simply
not acting within the course and scope of his duties under Montana law.”56
The United States next asserts that L.B.’s argument under
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 fails because sexual assault is not
of the same general nature as that authorized by the BIA or incidental to
the conduct authorized by the BIA.57 The United States asserts that L.B.
failed to show that Bullcoming’s sexual assault of L.B. was either
authorized or similar to conduct authorized by the BIA and points out that
Bullcoming’s sexual assault of L.B. was in stark contrast to the authorized
duties of “enforcing the law.”58
Lastly, the United States argues that certification to the Montana
Supreme Court is improper as this is not a “close question.” According to
the United States, Montana law clearly resolves the issue because under
established precedent of respondeat superior, Bullcoming did not act in the
scope and course of his employment when he sexually assaulted L.B.59
Moreover, the United States claims that L.B. improperly moved the district
court for certification to the Montana Supreme Court after the federal
magistrate issued “an adverse recommendation.”60
IV.

ANALYSIS

The culpability of the United States hinges on whether the Court
determines Bullcoming acted within the scope of his employment when
he sexually assaulted L.B. To determine if Bullcoming acted within the
53

Id. (citing Harrington v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 33 P.2d 553, 558
(Mont. 1934)).
54
Maguire v. State, 835 P.2d 755, 758 (Mont. 1992).
55
Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 11, at 12.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 22.
58
Id. at 23.
59
Id. at 28.
60
Id. at 27.
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scope of his employment, the Court will likely consider: (A) the scope of
employment test in Keller;61 (B) the Court’s findings in Kornec and
Brenden v. City of Billings;62 (C) the distinguishing facts of this case from
Maguire; and (D) the unique policy considerations for Indian country in
Montana.
A. The Keller scope of employment test and the § 229(2) factors
The Court will likely find, using the Keller scope of employment
test, that Bullcoming acted within the scope of his employment because
his sexual assault of L.B. was incidental to his authorized BIA duties.63
For an employee’s act to be incidental to their authorized duties, an act
must be (1) “subordinate to or perinate to an act which the servant is
authorized,”64 (2) “within the ultimate objective of the principal,”65 and (3)
“an act which is not unlikely that such a servant might do.”66 The Court in
Keller used four of the § 229(2) factors to determine if a grocery store
employee’s acts were incidental to his authorized duties as the store’s
manager:
(a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such
servants; (b) the time, place, and purpose of the act; (f)
whether or not the master has reason to expect that such
an act will be done; and (i) the extent of departure from
the normal method of accomplishing an authorized
result.67

Here, the Court will likely use the same factors to determine if
Bullcoming’s acts were incidental to his authorized BIA duties.
The Court will likely find that sexually inappropriate acts are
common among BIA officers despite the United States asserting that

61

Keller v. Safeway Stores, 108 P.2d 605, 610 (Mont. 1940); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229(2) (AM. L. INST., Westlaw Edge
Mar. 2022).
62
Kornec v. Mike Horse Mining & Milling, 180 P.2d 252, 256 (Mont.
1947); Brenden v. City of Billings, 470 P.3d 168, 174 (Mont. 2020).
63
Keller, 108 P.2d at 610; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
229(2).
64
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. b.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Keller, 108 P.2d at 610.
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police “who elect[ ] to not enforce the law in exchange for sexual favors”
are uncommon.68 The ACLU brief in support of L.B. provides:
The BIA has one of the highest rates of sexual harassment
among agencies within the U.S. Department of the
Interior (DOI), and the DOI Office of the Inspector
General . . . has faulted the BIA management for putting
forth “little or no effort . . . to investigate the veracity of
the allegation or determine the extent of the problem.”69
The ACLU brief demonstrates that sexually inappropriate behavior is a
pervasive issue within the agency.70
Next, the Court will likely find the § 229(2)(b) factor, “time, place,
and purpose of the act,”71 could lean in favor of either L.B. or the United
States. Comment e to § 229(2)(b) provides: “The fact that the act is done
at an unauthorized place or time or is actuated by a purpose not to serve
the master indicates that the act is not within the scope of employment.”72
Additionally, comment e states that the Court should consider whether an
act is “unauthorized in more than one aspect.”73 While the Court will likely
find the time and place of the sexual assault to be authorized as the BIA is
authorized to effectuate policing duties within the bounds of the Northern
Cheyenne Reservation,74 the Court will likely have more difficulty finding
Bullcoming actuated the sexual assault with the purpose to serve the
United States.75
The Court will likely find factor § 229(2)(f) leans in favor of L.B.
if it considers the pervasive sexual harassment within the BIA.76 The
United States should expect a continuation of such behavior when it has
failed to remedy the issue.77

68

Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 11, at 19.
Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and ACLU of
Montana Foundation, Inc. at 8–9, L.B. v. United States, No. 20-35514 (9th Cir.
Dec. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/KVF5-QMTB [hereinafter ACLU Amici Curiae
Brief].
70
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. b.
71
Id. § 229(2)(b).
72
Id. § 229 cmt. e.
73
Id.
74
L.B. v. United States, 8 F.4th 868, 869 (9th Cir. 2021), certified
question accepted sub nom. 495 P.3d 424 (Mont. 2021); Appellant’s Reply
Brief, supra note 4, at 4.
75
Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 11, at 23.
76
ACLU Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 69, at 9.
77
Id.
69
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Lastly, § 229(2)(i) requires the Court to analyze “the extent of
departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized
result.”78 The Court will likely conclude this factor leans in favor of the
United States as sexual assault greatly departed from Bullcoming’s
authorized police authority, such as writing L.B. a warning or citation for
being intoxicated.79
B. The Court’s findings in Kornec and Brenden
The Court will likely find Bullcoming to have acted within the
scope of his employment due to its recent precedent in Brenden80 and its
previous findings in Kornec.81
The Court’s findings in Brenden undermine the United States’s
interpretation that under Kornec, Bullcoming did not act in the scope of
his employment when he sexually assaulted L.B. The United States
interpreted Kornec as a bright-line rule: “If an employee acts from ‘purely
personal motives . . . in no way connected to the employer’s interest’. . .
then the master is not liable.”82 However, the Court in Brenden found that
“self-interest does not preclude an act from the scope of employment if the
employee was motivated by any purpose or intent to serve the employer’s
interest ‘to any appreciable extent.’”83 Further, the Court in Kornec
determined that “when a servant carrying out his assigned duties makes an
assault as result of a quarrel which arose as a consequence of his
performance of the task imposed and at the time and place of performance
of the duties he was employed to do, then the master is liable.”84
Bullcoming’s motivation for engaging with L.B. was explicitly related to
his job as a BIA officer because he responded to her 911 call and
conducted several authorized police activities such as subjecting L.B. to
the breathalyzer.85 The Court in Brenden next moved to a discussion of
Restatement (Second) § 230 comment c: “conduct is within the scope of
employment even if it has no connection with the act which the employee
is required to perform.”86 Bullcoming went to L.B.’s home as a BIA officer
in response to her 911 call, connecting Bullcoming’s sexual assault of L.B.
78

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229(2)(i).
Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 11, at 22.
80
Brenden v. City of Billings, 470 P.3d 168, 174 (Mont. 2020).
81
Kornec v. Mike Horse Mining & Milling, 180 P.2d 252, 257 (Mont.
79

1947).
82

Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 11, at 18–19.
Brenden, 470 P.3d at 174.
84
Kornec, 180 P.2d at 257.
85
L.B. v. United States, 8 F.4th 868, 870 (9th Cir. 2021), certified
question accepted sub nom. 495 P.3d 424 (Mont. 2021).
86
Brenden, 470 P.3d at 174.
83

2022

PREVIEW: L.B. V. UNITED STATES

11

to his required BIA officer duties.87 The Court in Brenden found that
imposing vicarious liability on employers provides incentive to “reduce
tortious conduct.”88
C. Distinguishing L.B. from Maguire
Next, the Court will likely find the United States’s interpretation
of the Court’s holding in Maguire to be improperly broad. The United
States properly asserts that the Court in Maguire limited the nondelegable-duty-doctrine to “instances of safety where the subject matter is
inherently dangerous”89 and found sexual assault to be out of the scope of
a state hospital employee’s employment.90 However, the United States
improperly asserts Maguire created a bright-line rule, excluding all sexual
assault from the scope of employment, and that the lower courts correctly
denied certification to the Montana Supreme Court on the basis that L.B.
did not present “a novel argument.”91 L.B effectively distinguishes her
case from Maguire by asserting that Maguire “did not involve a law
enforcement officer who leveraged his power to coerce a victim.”92 The
United States “apportions” BIA officers with the responsibility of
protecting and serving its citizens.93 Bullcoming strategically calculated
his coercion of L.B. by utilizing these apportioned authorized police
powers to entrap L.B. in a horrific situation. For example, Bullcoming
responded to L.B.’s 911 call, he administered a breathalyzer exam, and he
threatened to arrest L.B. and to take her children away.94 Bullcoming acted
as a BIA agent during his entire interaction with L.B. The United States
argues that “Bullcoming’s policing suddenly stopped when he sexually
assaulted L.B.”95 The Maguire decision does not discuss facts “resembling
Bullcoming’s leveraging his police power to rape L.B.”96 As such, the
United States improperly construes the Maguire holding as creating an
absolute bar to the United States being liable to victims of sexual assault
in Montana.

87

Id.
ACLU Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 69, at 12.
89
Maguire v. State, 835 P.2d 755, 759 (Mont. 1992); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214 cmt. c (“Highly Dangerous
Activities”).
90
Maguire, 835 P.2d at 759.
91
Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 11, at 30–31.
92
ACLU Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 69, at 17.
93
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229(d).
94
ACLU Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 69, at 17.
95
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 4, at 4.
96
ACLU Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 69, at 19.
88
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D. Policy considerations for Indian country in Montana
Lastly, this case presents the Court a chance to elevate the
protection of its vulnerable citizens in the aftermath of Maguire. In his
dissent in Maguire, Justice Trieweiler categorized the majority’s opinion
as a “tragic and misguided decision which once again demonstrates that,
given the choice, the majority would protect the State rather than its
citizens.”97 Likewise, failing to hold the United States accountable for
Bullcoming’s actions conveys a “tragic and misguided” message to the
Indigenous peoples of Montana that their lives are not worth protecting.98
The ACLU succinctly illustrates the conundrum of unequal and
inadequate legal protection for Montana’s indigenous population residing
within reservations: “[t]his dichotomy . . . has a disproportionate effect on
Montana’s Indigenous population, who are more likely to interact with
federal, rather than state or local, law enforcement officers.”99 While the
United States points to this Court’s previous finding that an extension of
Montana law absent “prior judicial decisions” should come from the
legislature,100 the Court has also stated it “has an obligation to act” when
the “legislature has not acted to regulate the affairs of people.”101 One
“tribal judge described the FBI’s handling of sexual assault on Indian
reservations as a ‘black hole’” as “rape kits never come back.”102
Moreover, the United States Federal Prosecutor’s office failed to prosecute
67% of sex crimes in Indian country but did not provide adequate
information to tribes to engage in their own prosecution.103 Montana’s
Indigenous population represents “6.7% of the population, but were the
subjects of 26% of the state’s missing persons reports between 20162018.”104 The United States has failed to regulate sex crimes in Indian
country through the legislature; L.B. v. United States provides the Court

97

Maguire v. State, 835 P.2d 755, 764 (Mont. 1992) (Trieweiler, J.,
dissenting).
98
ACLU Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 69, at 2.
99
Id. at 3 (citing L.B. v. United States, 8 F.4th 868, 871 (9th Cir.
2021)).
100
Maguire, 835 P.2d at 759.
101
Id. at 766 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting) (citing Haker v. Southwestern
Ry. Co., 578 P.2d 724, 727 (Mont. 1978).
102
ACLU Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 69, at 4.
103
Id. at 6.
104
Id. at 5.
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the opportunity to act in the face of legislative failure to protect Montana’s
Indigenous populations.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court will likely conclude Bullcoming acted in his official
capacity as a BIA officer when he sexually assaulted L.B., thus finding the
United States government liable to L.B. for damages. The Court’s
consideration of the established scope of employment test, the
distinguishing factors from Maguire, the policy considerations for Indian
country in Montana, and the Court’s holding in Brenden will likely support
this conclusion. With this conclusion, the Court will not only appropriately
clarify its holding in Maguire, but also acknowledge the legislature’s
failure to adequately protect people residing within reservation
boundaries.

